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BOOK REVIEWS

PREPARATION AND EXECUTION
Warship Builders: An Industrial History of U.S. Naval Shipbuilding, 1922–1945, by Thomas Heinrich.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2020. 360 pages. $39.95.

Challenging conventional narratives is a
fundamental part of historical research if
we are to advance our understanding of
the past. In this spirit, Thomas Heinrich
(Baruch College, City University of
New York) questions the established
interpretation of U.S. war mobilization
in World War II in his volume Warship
Builders: An Industrial History of U.S.
Naval Shipbuilding, 1922–1945. Through
a well-researched study of American
shipbuilding between the 1920s and
1940s, Heinrich, a naval historian and
business professor, demonstrates how the
private-driven-mobilization theory fails
to describe fully the reality of the naval
shipbuilding industry and the reasons
for its success during World War II.
Instead of carrying out a massive
wartime conversion at the beginning of
the 1940s, private naval yards used the
benefits of the federal investments of the
1930s and the construction experience
gained thereby to enable them to churn
out a winning two-ocean fleet. Indeed, by
its nature the shipbuilding industry did
not require adoption of standard Fordist
practices, such as task simplification
and design freeze, to deliver top-notch
vessels. Rather, naval constructors relied
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on batch formats, flexible specialization,
disintegrated production, and skilled
labor to meet the Navy’s construction
standards. Most importantly, these
practices were well suited to producing
a variety of warships—a flexibility that
eventually proved crucial to providing
an effective naval force to deploy against
the Axis. As the war demonstrated,
not only was a massive naval force
indispensable, but its composition also
required naval constructors to develop
industrial practices that could meet the
necessary high degree of specialization
and flexibility and match the diverse
strategic requirements of the Navy.
The market fluctuations of the interwar
years also contributed to bringing
naval shipbuilders up to the challenge.
After World War I, the Washington
Naval Treaty (1922) and its subsequent
London updates (1930 and 1936) curbed
naval ship output by imposing severe
restrictions on the numbers of combatants per signatory and the permitted
tonnage of cruisers, destroyers, and
submarines, which temporarily turned
private builders’ attention to merchant
ships as their top product. When the
Great Depression hit, however, private

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 2, Art. 10

yards saw this second-best demand for
commercial vessels plummet. To navigate
the rough waters of the remaining
interwar years, private yard owners,
whose ranks already embraced few if
any thriving producers in the industry,
avoided bankruptcy by resorting to
anticompetitive practices such as
cartelizing federal contracts. While
Congress looked askance at the practice,
cartelization brought about structural
benefits for private yards, which eventually set the foundations for the slow
recovery of the industry in the 1930s
and the wartime boom of the 1940s.
The federal government, whose role
Heinrich details precisely in his book,
was the determinant of the steady
progression of the national naval
industry out of the quicksand of the
interwar years. Chapter 1 discusses how
the Roosevelt administration not only
used the maritime industrial sector as
a vehicle to curb high unemployment
rates among individual workers but
also played a crucial role in financing
the progressive recovery of the private
yards as industrial entities. Therefore,
when France fell in 1940 and war struck
the United States a year and a half later,
naval shipbuilders were ready to meet
the challenge of large-scale production;
eventually they outpaced the combined
output of both allies and foes (chapters
3–4). However, this “miraculous” war
mobilization was possible only because
private yards had acquired essential
production skills over the interwar
period and the federal government had
supported the industry through the
Great Depression. Thus, as Heinrich
points out, a narrative restricted to
private-driven conversion fails to explain
thoroughly how the interplay of private
and public actors drove America into the
leading role in naval industrial output.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss2/10

B O O K R E V I E WS

171

A few strong points in the volume
make a case for Heinrich’s narrative
to become the new convention for
understanding how American industrial might won World War II. First,
the book clearly describes how public
and private actors played intertwined
roles in creating a winning two-ocean
navy. This analysis begins with thorough explanations of interwar naval
technology in chapter 2 and industrial
management in chapters 4 and 5.
Another positive element of Warship
Builders is Heinrich’s ability to articulate
his argument from various historical
perspectives, and ultimately to offer a
complete narrative of how economic,
military, political, and technological
factors contributed to the establishment and triumph of American sea
power. Throughout the volume, Heinrich
consistently draws links among these
elements, delivering a meticulous
account of the concerted endeavor
of private enterprises and the federal
government behind the American naval
effort in World War II. In this respect,
Heinrich is highly successful at puzzling
together all the information relevant to
his revisionist narrative of American war
mobilization without losing the balance
among different angles of analysis.
A third excellent element of the book
is the persistent inclusion throughout
the volume of accounts of American
allies’ and foes’ industrial practices
and shipbuilding choices. Every comparative description validates Heinrich’s
thesis and provides each chapter
with a decisive edge of analysis.
Perhaps the only improvement that could
upgrade the book from a contemporary
classic to a timeless masterpiece would
be adding more observations that
underscore the strategic implications of
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shipbuilding policies. Although major
strategic effects of each country’s naval
industrial production are presented
clearly—especially for the Americans—
some interesting insights on technology,
industrial procedures, and maritime
strategy remain between the lines.
In conclusion, Warship Builders is a
much-needed and groundbreaking volume about the most staggering industrial
conversion in American, indeed world,
history. With outstanding attention to
detail and a pleasantly precise style,
Heinrich tackles fundamental inconsistencies in the conventional narrative and
provides an authoritative description of
the intersections between private and
public sectors in the American wartime
economy during World War II. Lastly,
Heinrich’s study of American shipbuilding in the interwar years highlights how
crucial forward-thinking strategy and industrial planning are when preparing for
a possible great-power conflict against
insidious naval competitors. In this respect, Heinrich’s contribution also offers
food for thought to maritime historians
and analysts as they examine America’s
competitors’ current maritime buildups.
ANNA MATILDE BASSOLI

A Game of Birds and Wolves: The Secret Game
That Won the War, by Simon Parkin. London:
Hodder & Stoughton, 2019. 310 pages. $29.

During the Battle of the Atlantic in
World War II, almost three thousand
Allied merchant ships and warships succumbed to U-boats under the command
of Admiral Karl Dönitz. Journalist and
games writer Simon Parkin presents the
story of a top secret unit established in
Liverpool at the Western Approaches
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Command headquarters during the
height of the Battle of the Atlantic.
Recounting the history and work of this
unit—the Western Approaches Tactical
Unit (WATU), created by Winston
Churchill in 1942—Parkin explores the
role of war games in British efforts to
defeat U-boat operations against Allied
shipping. WATU was led by Commander (later Captain) Gilbert H. Roberts,
RN, who had been recalled to service
following medical retirement for tuberculosis in 1938, and was staffed largely
by members of the Women’s Royal Naval
Service (WRNS, known as “Wrens”). In
a flowing narrative, Parkin recounts the
background to and development of a
war game pitting convoy escorts against
U-boats. Designed as a training exercise
for convoy-escort officers, its lessons
were operationalized readily (p. 143).
The game was laid out on the top floor
of Derby House in Liverpool. Staffed
by Roberts and a total of sixty-six
Wrens from 1942 to 1945, the game
was used to show escort officers from
many Allied nations what Roberts
considered the best way to be sure of
sighting U-boats trying to get into the
midst of the convoy. Once it was fully
developed, the course or war game took
six days to complete, and about fifty
officers per course participated. Courses
were held every week from February
1942 to the end of July 1945—more
than 130 games or courses and five
thousand participants by war’s end
(p. 264). The “birds” in the book title
references British slang for women, the
Wrens in particular; the “wolves” were
the U-boats, along with their captains
and crews, that frequently operated in
groups or packs (i.e., “wolf packs”). That
tactic—known as Die Rudeltaktik—had
been tried and abandoned early in the
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